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Abstract
Despite the growing attention innovation ecosystems have received from scholars and practitioners, rather little is known 
about the crucial birth and expansion phases that these ecosystems experience. Through a single case in the complex 
product system (CoPS) environment, this paper investigates the development of an innovation ecosystem between 1980 
and 2007. The findings demonstrate that the ecosystem’s birth phase includes sub-phases, namely, invention and start-up, 
where the ecosystem is reconfigured to find the appropriate form and the proper actors to satisfy the first customer’s 
requirements. Moreover, the duration of the expansion phase is found to be remarkably long, suggesting that within the 
CoPS setting, expansion may also include two or more sub-phases. 
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Introduction
The systemic nature of products and services bring together 
specialized firms from different industries into an integrated 
organizational system or network. Referred to as business 
ecosystems or innovation ecosystems, this network of 
organizations aim to deliver holistic product or service value 
to the end-user. The semiconductor lithography ecosystem 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2010), the PC (personal computer) 
ecosystem (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002), and the Firefox 
browser ecosystem (Tiwana et al., 2010) are just some 
examples of such organizational networks that sponsor 
collective and interdependent innovation.
The burgeoning significance of ecosystems thinking for 
both practitioners and scholars has culminated in different 
research agendas, which aim to enhance our understanding 
of what innovation ecosystems are and how they change 
over time (Mäkinen and Dedehayir, 2012). Adner (2012) gives 
a prominent example of this by introducing methods for 
designing the ecosystem’s ‘value blueprint’ (i.e. locations and 
links between ecosystem actors), foreseeing risks to value 
creation, determining the value of leadership and followership 
roles in the ecosystem, timing of innovation introductions, 
and the dynamic reconfiguration of the ecosystem over time. 
Notwithstanding this and similar valuable contributions, the 
process of how ecosystems come to existence in the first 
place has received scarce attention. In this paper, we aim to 
address this very issue. Using the ecosystem life cycle phases 
(birth, expansion, leadership, and self-renewal) identified by 
James F. Moore (1993), a pioneering scholar in this field of 
inquiry, we pose the following research question: how are 
innovation ecosystem born and how do they expand?
Our paper commences with a short review of the 
ecosystems literature focusing on the actors that constitute 
these networks, and an elaboration of the life cycle phases 
of ecosystem change. We then employ a case study 
methodology, given the nature of the research question 
that is posed, to explore the actors, their actions, and 
other events that mark the birth and expansion of a single 
innovation ecosystem. The empirical case we analyze is the 
‘flash converting furnace’ ecosystem, which represents the 
network of organizations that collaborate in producing 
the complex product system (i.e. the furnace) integrated 
into copper smelting operations. Our case study results 
underline seminal factors, such as ecosystem leadership, key 
actors, and external influences, which govern the evolution 
of the ecosystem from the initial discovery of the technology 




Innovation ecosystems describe the network of firms, 
which collectively produce a holistic, integrated product 
system that creates value for firms as well as end-users. The 
ecosystem comprises a number of organizations, which can 
be classified under some generic types. The most significant 
member of an ecosystem is the ‘keystone’ (Iansiti and Levien, 
2004), also referred to as platform leader (Cusumano and 
Gawer, 2002) or ecosystem leader (Moore, 1993), which 
regulates the overall function of the ecosystem. Even though 
keystones exert substantial power within a given ecosystem 
and command a greater share of the overall profits (Moore, 
1993), they represent only a small biomass or population of 
organizations of that ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). 
For example, firms such as Wal-Mart, Microsoft, Apple, 
and Mozilla have been crucial platform leaders to their 
respective ecosystems. 
The keystone is supported by ‘niche players’, which form 
the great majority of the ecosystem and generate the 
largest portion of innovations as well as the created value. 
Niche players have specialized functions that contribute 
toward the holistic function of the ecosystem. Their 
specialization also helps them differentiate from other 
members of the ecosystem. The role of niche players in the 
ecosystem often means that they are also ‘complementors’ 
who help the platform leader expand the realms of its 
application. For example, Intel and Microsoft are platform 
leaders in the PC ecosystem because they assume great 
authority in the architectural design of the PC system 
and subsequently govern a plethora of complementors 
(i.e. firms offering complementary technologies), which 
produce platform-specific hardware and software products 
(Cusumano and Gawer, 2002).
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Method
We employ the case study methodology in our empirical 
work, as our objective is to investigate the birth and 
expansion of a contemporary innovation ecosystem, 
and furthermore, because it is a preferred approach for 
the form of research question that we have raised (Yin, 
1994). Following the general guideline stipulated by Yin 
(1994), we implemented a single, holistic case study design, 
and collected and analyzed data through different case 
related sources.
In accordance with our research question, the innovation 
ecosystem was chosen as the unit of analysis. The selected 
case manifests the innovation ecosystem intensely, but not 
extremely (Miles and Huberman, 1994) – it represents a 
typical technological invention in the industrial settings 
where the time scale is a quarter of a century. We studied 
the ‘Flash Converting Furnace’ (FCF) innovation ecosystem, 
which centers about a complex product system (Miller 
et al., 1995) used in copper production. In our case study 
we investigated the actors that played central roles and 
the events that took place during the birth and expansion 
of the ecosystem, from the time of first discovery of a 
technology that carried commercialization potential (i.e. 
1981-82) until the present. The evidence accessed in our 
case study was sourced primarily from interviews, and 
supplemented by documents. 
We conducted two rounds of interviews with key 
informants from the keystone organization, Outotec, of the 
FCF ecosystem . In the first round, our aim was to access 
information on the innovation itself and its impact on the 
copper production industry. By reviewing the results of 
the first round of interviews, we were able to hone the 
focus of the follow up interview on the ecosystem birth 
and expansion. All interviews were kept open-ended, with 
a focus on guiding the conversation rather than maintaining 
a strict query structure. The duration of the interviews 
ranged between two and three hours, with some flexibility 
implemented to cater for the open-ended nature of the 
interview. An external analyst then transcribed the audio 
recordings of the interviews, and the investigators scoured 
the transcript records in a systematic fashion to reveal vital 
information. This information was, in turn, compared to the 
notes and observations produced during the interviews. In 
this manner, we performed triangulation among different 
evaluators (Yin, 1994).
Ecosystem life cycle 
Moore (1993) suggests that innovation ecosystems progress 
through four life cycle phases: birth, expansion, leadership, 
and self-renewal (or death). Each phase is marked by certain 
characteristics, which we elaborate below.
In the birth phase the product and service requirements 
of the customer must be well understood by all members 
of the ecosystem. This understanding guarantees the 
collaboration of actors towards common objectives. In this 
phase, the ecosystem leader assumes a central position 
by securing the cooperation of key organizations which 
will provide complementary products and services that 
will collectively deliver value to the customer. It is also 
important for the keystone to protect the new innovation 
idea from competitors, while at the same time forging 
strong ties with lead customers and important channels of 
delivery (Moore, 1993).
In the second phase, the ecosystem expands into new 
territories of application. It is possible that rivalries 
eventuate as the same application realm may be targeted 
by different ecosystems. These battles are more likely to be 
won by a given ecosystem if established organizations apply 
their expertise in complementary assets, such as marketing 
and sales, as well as production and distribution, to the 
ecosystem’s cause. Expansion into new territories naturally 
requires the stimulation of market demand albeit within 
the capacity of the ecosystem. It is therefore vital that the 
ecosystem leader is able to maintain strong relationships 
with the customer and at the same time with suppliers 
(Moore, 1993).
The third stage of ecosystem evolution is a period of 
consolidation and establishment. This stage centers on 
establishing ecosystem leadership and the establishment 
of stability in the ecosystem’s sub-systems and processes. 
These foundations, together with a clear vision of 
future development, enhance the commitment of 
component suppliers and complement producers, thereby 
institutionalizing a true network of cooperators (Moore, 
1993). And the final stage is a response of the mature 
ecosystem to emerging threats from new ecosystems 
and innovations, or significant upheavals and alterations 
in the ecosystem’s environment, such as those pertaining 
to government regulations and demographic traits, which 
create opportunities for new ecosystems to emerge. There 
are two possible reactions to these challenges: self-renewal 
or death of the ecosystem.
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coupled with relatively high unit costs, and its long life 
cycle that spans decades. The FCF is a sub-system of the 
copper smelting facility, and has been first commercialized 
by Outotec (former technology division of Outokumpu) 
and Kennecott. Outotec also acts as the system integrator 
that supplies the core, proprietary technologies of the flash 
converting furnace, while integrating technologies produced 
by a number of suppliers.
Ecosystem birth
The birth of the FCF innovation ecosystem began in 1981-
82, with the invention of the Solid Matte Oxygen Converting 
(SMOC) technique. The inventor, an employee of the 
copper smelting firm Kennecott Utah Copper (Salt Lake 
City, Utah, USA), contacted Outotec with the possibility 
of developing a copper conversion process based on his 
discovery, thereby initiating the formation of the ecosystem. 
The connection between the inventor and the soon-to-be 
keystone organization, Outotec, triggered a series of search 
routines within the latter to verify the technical viability of 
converting copper using SMOC. References were known 
for comparable technological applications, such as in already 
existing Australian and Polish copper smelting facilities, 
and Outotec’s own research center was engaged with the 
task of conducting research into technical issues. These 
Findings: The FCF innovation ecosystem
The copper extraction process begins with mining of 
copper ore, which contains only a very small percentage of 
copper. Successive processes separate the copper from the 
rock and other valueless materials that surround it. These 
sequential steps include comminution (reducing the mined 
solid materials in size, e.g. through crushing), froth flotation 
(processing the crushed ore to produce copper concentrate), 
and roasting (partially oxidizing the concentrate for further 
treatment). However, in recent decades this roasting step 
has been made redundant with the adoption of the flash 
smelting technique, which is a high temperature process 
that produces liquid in the form of copper matte (containing 
copper in the form of copper and iron sulfides) and slag 
(unwanted metal and silicon oxides). The flash converting 
process (using the FCF), in turn, treats the copper matte 
by removing the iron and sulfur, leaving behind almost pure 
copper  (Schlesinger et al., 2011).
The FCF can be classified as a complex product system 
(CoPS) because of its inherent complexity that brings 
together knowledge from a wide range of scientific realms, 
including “flash reactions, slag chemistry, flow phenomena 
in the furnace, and the process thermodynamics” (Kojo 
et al., 2009), its low gas volume production, its B2B nature 
Figure 1. The FCF innovation ecosystem at birth.
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modernized Utah plant. In 1995, the first Flash Converting 
Furnace was put into operation at Kennecott Utah Copper.
The implementation of the FCF technology at Kennecott’s 
copper smelting facility was accompanied by technical 
problems, which limited the operational capacity of the 
technology. While these problems did not originate from 
within the technical scope of the FCF technology itself, the 
systemic nature of the copper smelting operation meant 
that insufficient capacity in complementary technologies 
acted as bottlenecks to copper conversion through the 
FCF. For example, capacity deficiency was observed in the 
anode casting sub-system. This bottleneck was resolved 
by subtracting the original sub-system provider from the 
ecosystem and awarding the anode casting contract to 
Outotec’s engineering division. By 1996-97, in other words 
approximately two years after the first implementation 
of the FCF technology, the technical bottlenecks were 
alleviated, allowing the FCF technology to deliver its 
designed operational capacity in the field. This date 
therefore marks the time of first successful commercial 
application of the technology, and as a result ends the 
birth phase of the ecosystem.
Ecosystem expansion 
Having commercialized the FCF technology, Outotec directed 
the innovation ecosystem to the phase of expansion. In the 
case of the FCF innovation ecosystem, expansion meant 
implementing the technology in different copper smelting 
plants, possibly entailing different geographical contexts. 
To this end, the ecosystem first recognized an opportunity 
to expand within Finland, the home turf of the keystone 
organization, where the Harjavalta smelter (Outokumpu’s 
base metals division, earlier involved in pilot testing) was 
planning to increase production capacity in 1995-96. The 
possibility of increasing plant capacity using old copper 
converting technology released from another production 
unit (which would also reduce costs), placed the proponents 
of the FCF technology in opposition with those in favor of 
the older technology. This internal dialogue nonetheless 
rejected FCF implementation, thereby closing the first 
opportunity for ecosystem expansion. 
However, there were more than 150 copper smelters 
in operation around the world in the early 2000s , and 
between 1999 and 2002, the ecosystem sought expansion 
into the South American application field, a region that is 
globally prominent in copper production. Nevertheless, 
the opportunities successively dissipated here as well. In 
Peru, the Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) 
initiated a project to expand production capacity, while 
concurrently reducing emissions. They turned to Outotec 
for the FCF technology, which would enable the smelter to 
attain its objectives. Despite carrying out small-scale pilot 
technical feasibility studies were followed by two pilot tests 
conducted in Outotec’s research center (Pori, Finland), in 
1984 and 1985, respectively. 
The four year period from initial discovery of the SMOC 
technique to pilot testing of the FCF technology had already 
brought and linked ecosystem actors such as Outotec (the 
ecosystem leader), the suppliers of sub-system technologies 
integrated into the FCF by Outotec, research laboratories, 
and a (potential) direct customer in Kennecott Utah Copper. 
Additionally, the complementors that entered the fray leading 
up to pilot testing were the providers of technological sub-
systems integrated into Kennecott’s smelting facility to 
function together with the FCF, and also the universities. 
Columbia University developed numerical models for the 
flash converting process, while the Helsinki University of 
Technology and the University of Utah provided support 
to both Outotec and Kennecott through basic research 
and kinetic models. These actors and their connections 
during the birth phase of the FCF innovation ecosystem 
are shown in Figure 1.
In the 1980’s, however, the copper industry was hit with a 
substantial fall in copper prices, which led to a four year 
delay in Kennecott’s implementation of the FCF technology 
(Figure 1 marks this as a negative external influence to the 
evolution of the ecosystem). It was not until the end of the 
1980s and the very beginning of the 1990s that Kennecott 
reinitiated efforts to integrate the FCF technology into their 
facilities. The recommencement of this effort was aided by 
yet another factor external to the ecosystem, when the State 
of Utah introduced new emission regulations in 1989-90, 
thus encouraging, perhaps better still, compelling production 
plants to align with the new levels of allowed emissions 
(Figure 1 marks this as a positive external influence to the 
evolution of the ecosystem). Among others, this was a factor 
that brought the FCF technology back onto the table of 
Kennecott executives. 
During this time, the center of gravity in the ecosystem’s 
development seemed to have shifted from Outotec in Finland 
to Kennecott in the USA. Our case study also shows that 
Kennecott linked a new actor to the ecosystem in the form 
of a specialized engineering company to assist in exploring 
technological options, and simultaneously played a major 
role in coordinating the final large-scale implementation of 
the FCF technology. This nevertheless should not come as 
a surprise, given that Kennecott would need to bear the 
consequences of a large investment in the form of benefits 
as well as risks that would emerge from integrating the 
technology into their production line. After the final large-
scale testing in 1991 (conducted at the Pori pilot plant 
with solidified matte produced at the Harjavalta smelter in 
Finland), Kennecott integrated the FCF technology into the 
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After these unsuccessful expansion attempts, the FCF 
innovation ecosystem was finally able to expand into the 
Chinese market in 2007 (see Figure 2). The opportunity for 
expansion into this area (yet another prominent copper 
producing region) was already created in 1997 when the 
Chinese Central Government brought in new regulations for 
emissions. Over the following years, these regulations were 
tightened by both the Central Government and the Chinese 
Local Governments . Within this newly regulated context, 
Outotec was approached by a Chinese entrepreneur 
in 2005, who showed great interest in investing in a new 
copper smelter. Only two years later, in 2007, the FCFs were 
implemented in the new (i.e. greenfield) Yanggu Xiangguang 
Copper smelter (Kojo et al., 2009). Even more significantly, 
the new smelter also served as an exemplar for other 
tests, however, FCFs were not integrated into the Peruvian 
smelter for two reasons outside of the keystone’s direct 
control. Firstly, the new emission regulations in Peru were in 
fact not as stringent as they were back in Europe or the U.S. 
The emission reduction objective of SPCC thus appeared 
to be self-motivated. Secondly, when a Mexican copper 
company acquired substantial shares of SPCC, the void 
between actual regulations and SPCC’s emission reduction 
initiative was exploited, resulting in the smelter being 
rebuilt without FCFs. The first South American expansion 
effort was subsequently unsuccessful. Two other attempts 
were made, this time in Chile, where new copper smelters 
were planned to be built. While Outotec joined these plans 
with the possibility of integrating FCFs, these projects were 
only later to be cancelled. These unsuccessful ecosystem 
expansion endeavors are shown in Figure 2.
 
Figure 2. The FCF innovation ecosystem at expansion.
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The invention sub-phase marks the discovery of a new 
technique, method, product, or process, in other words 
a new technology, and also incorporates the technical 
feasibility assessment of the technology (e.g. through pilot 
testing). The discovery of a new technology is at times the 
result of systematic exploration and at other times through 
mere serendipity. This period of ecosystem development 
importantly relies on the roles of individuals, such as scientists 
and engineers who discover, manipulate, and work towards 
the application of the technology, laying the first stones on 
the pathway towards technology commercialization. The 
seminal role of individuals is an important observation 
and valuable addition to the existing model of ecosystem 
development, which predominantly considers the actors at 
the organizational level.
The work of individuals in the invention sub-phase is 
supported by other actors such as universities and research 
laboratories, which provide scientific support and establish 
technical feasibility. The presence of an ecosystem leader is 
indispensable during this time. In the absence of a keystone 
organization, which brings together and connects the actors 
that will develop the technological innovation, the ecosystem 
faces the risk of disintegration already in the invention sub-
phase. As a result, the keystone configures the ecosystem 
Chinese copper smelters, which, under the tighter emission 
regulations, opted to increase their own production 
capacities with FCFs. Consequently, after approximately 12 
years, the expansion phase of the FCF innovation ecosystem 
had commenced in 2007.
Discussion
The birth phase of the ecosystem life cycle spans the time 
from the discovery of a new technology until the first 
successful commercialization of that technology. Our case 
study shows that the birth phase can be divided into two 
distinct sub-phases, namely, the ‘invention’ and the ‘start-up’ 
sub-phases as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3.  The birth and expansion phases of ecosystem life cycle.
foundation during invention and gives it an opportunity 
to progress to the following phases of development. In 
addition to testing for technical viability, references of 
existing technologies in operation provide vitally needed 
confidence for the keystone firm to invest in developing 
the new innovation.
After technical feasibility assessment, the innovation is 
put to operation for the first time, thus commencing the 
start-up sub-phase. This period oversees the improvement 
of technological performance, which is typically curbed 
by technical bottlenecks that materialize during initial 
operation. Bottlenecks are seminal to ecosystem evolution 
as they form ‘focusing devices’ (Rosenberg, 1969), and it is 
through the resolution of bottlenecks (also referred to as 
‘reverse salients’) that the technological system can deliver 
the promised value to the customer (Rosenberg, 1976; 
Hughes, 1983; Dedehayir and Mäkinen, 2011; Dedehayir 
and Mäkinen, 2008). Often the removal of bottlenecks 
to value creation involves reconfiguring the ecosystem. 
Adner (2012) proposes five levers of reconfiguration: (i) 
‘relocation’ of actors; (ii) ‘separation’ of a single task into 
separate tasks to be undertaken by different actors; (iii) 
‘combination’ of separate tasks to be undertaken by a 
single actor; (iv) ‘addition’ of new actors to undertake tasks 
that are currently absent but would benefit the ecosystem; 
and (v) ‘subtraction’ of existing actors and their tasks 
to benefit the ecosystem. 
In our case study we witnessed the separation and addition 
strategies that overcame operation capacity bottlenecks, 
although these actions were not initiated by the keystone 
organization. In fact, we observed a shift in the ecosystem’s 
locus from the invention sub-phase to the start-up sub-
phase, as the intensity of ecosystem activities moved 
from inventing, developing, and testing the technology 
to operationalizing the technology in the field. This is an 
interesting finding, considering that the keystone is expected 
to take on a central role during this period. However, our 
case study shows that the ecosystem can still remain stable 
and progress toward value creation despite a moving center-
of-gravity. Moreover, we observed that external forces played 
a significant role in not only creating bottlenecks but also 
promoting the resolution of bottlenecks. The ecosystem 
leaders, key actors, as well as external forces influencing 
ecosystem birth and expansion are summarized in Table 1.
 
The start-up sub-phase ends with the removal of critical 
blockages, thus enabling the technology to perform as per 
design intent. The innovation ecosystem, in turn, enters the 
expansion phase, which denotes the period during which the 
technology is implemented in new areas or application fields. 
Our case study reveals several important characteristics of 
this life cycle phase. 
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trigger the change of course of ecosystem development. 
As our case study demonstrates, the influence of the 
superstructure is present in both the birth and expansion 
phases, and more importantly, the influences can be both 
negative and positive to the ecosystem’s development. For 
instance, the copper industry halted ecosystem development 
in the invention sub-phase, while the Chinese government 
created a window of opportunity for ecosystem expansion 
through more stringent emission regulations. And fourthly, 
our case study underlined that in addition to the actions of 
actors internal and external to the innovation ecosystem, 
the expansion of the ecosystem is determined by processes 
internal to the keystone organization. As underlined in 
prior literature (Christensen, 1997), the addition of a new 
innovation into the product portfolio of the organization 
presents a point of punctuation, resulting in the emergence 
of bipartisan groups, one supporting investment into the new 
technology, while the other opposing this notion. Whether 
the new technology receives the necessary resources to 
allow for continued research and development, and also the 
green light for seeking new application realms is reliant on 
the internal dialogue between these opposing camps. Our 
case study shows that the ecosystem’s expansion can indeed 
be blocked by this firm-centric process.
Firstly, the expansion into new application territories 
requires patience and energy. The effort needed to expand 
the ecosystem is somewhat akin to crossing the ‘chasm’ that 
exists between the early adopter and the early majority 
adopter categories identified in the diffusion of innovation 
research (Moore, 1999; Rogers, 1995). In both the diffusion 
of an innovation and the expansion of the ecosystem, 
the challenge for the innovating firm(s) is to attract new 
customers who will commit to acquiring the technology. 
The adoption decision of these potential customers typically 
requires confidence in the new technology which they 
gain from references of already implemented and working 
models. From the supply side, the ecosystem can therefore 
speed up the expansion process by seeking a ‘beachhead’ 
(Moore, 1999), in other words a small group of adopters 
in the larger application realm, which subsequently act 
as reference for other adopters. In fact, our case study 
showed that a single entrepreneur in China served as 
the beachhead and reference for a number of further 
adoptions in the same market . 
Connected with the above is the second observation that 
we make from the case study, which is the role of ‘chance 
events’ (Arthur, 2009) that lock the innovation ecosystem 
along a given path. For instance, after several unsuccessful 
attempts, the expansion of the ecosystem was initiated by 
a contact from an entrepreneur in China, an event that was 
not foreseen. We thirdly witness the vulnerability of the 
ecosystem to chance events sourced from outside of the 
ecosystem of actors. In particular, governments, regulatory 
bodies, industries, and institutions (referred to as the 
‘superstructure’ in CoPS literature (Miller et al., 1995)) can 
Table 1.  Actors of the innovation ecosystem at birth and expansion phases.
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Conclusions
We have demonstrated with a single case study how an 
ecosystem progresses through the early phases of its life 
cycle. More specifically, we identified two sub-phases in 
the birth phase, invention and start-up, which prepare the 
ecosystem to enter the expansion phase. From our case 
study, it appears that the initial customer should assume 
the role of ecosystem leader in order to reconfigure the 
ecosystem towards viable business. However, further 
research should be done in similar settings to dig deeper and 
provide more understanding of this type of development. 
In addition, further studies could shed more light on the 
role of the superstructure and its triggering nature – in 
other words, to identify whether these developments take 
place typically for CoPS ecosystems or whether similar 
windows of opportunity arise in other settings as well. We 
acknowledge the traditional case study research limitations. 
Our empirical work studied a single case in a particular 
setting and its selection was partly based on accessibility. 
Furthermore, the duration of our study was not sufficient 
to capture the ongoing nature of the ecosystem’s expansion, 
which may reveal important sub-phases as we have also 
observed in the birth phase of the ecosystem. We believe 
that continued investigation of other CoPS ecosystem cases 
can identify repeating patterns, while comparative studies of 
other innovation ecosystem types, such as those producing 
high-volume products and services, can illuminate important 
aspects of ecosystem evolution in general.
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